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CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING:
BUILDING BETTER LAW WITH THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
INTRODUCTION
The construction industry is the largest production sector in the
United States economy, representing about thirteen percent of the
gross national product with $500 billion in annual expenditures. 1
While the volume and complexity of the business done in the industry
calls for a definitive body of contract law, no such body of law exists.
Construction contract law is a confusing mix of the common law and
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), with no way to
predict which will apply-or whether both will apply-to a particular
case. Besides being confusing, the law does not adequately address
two of the industry's biggest problems: (1) the unequal balance of
power among the numerous parties to a construction contract, and (2)
the large amount of time-consuming, costly litigation resulting from
contract disputes.
In fact, since the law is unclear and unpredictable, the two prob-
lems are exacerbated. Parties have no clear statement regarding the
proper balance of power, so those with more power can take advan-
tage in contracting. In addition, parties continue to litigate because
where there is no strong precedent, each party can be convinced that it
will prevail. Because of the industry's impact on the economy and on
our lives, it is imperative that contract law be clarified in a way that
responds to the industry's unique problems. Applying Article 2 of the
UCC to construction contracts can both clarify the law and make the
law more responsive to construction disputes.
Part I of this Note describes the concerns in the construction in-
dustry that should be addressed by the law and surveys the law cur-
rently being applied to construction contracts. Part 11 proposes that to
solve the problems with the current approaches and to address the
concerns of the construction industry, the UCC should be applied
universally to all construction contracts that combine goods and ser-
See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform in a
Transactional System, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 463,465.
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vices. Part Ill demonstrates the ways in which the industry would be
affected by application of the UCC, including the benefits and prob-
lems such an application would create. Overall, the benefits outweigh
the problems, and consideration should be given to ways in which the
UCC can become the body of law governing sales-service construc-
tion contracts.
I. THE PROBLEM
A. Construction Industry Concerns
A basic construction contract includes an owner who pays to have
something built, an engineer or architect who designs what the owner
wants, and a contractor who builds based on the design.2 Most pro-
jects also include subcontractors,3 and these subcontractors can hire
their own subcontractors. Additionally, the contractors and subcon-
tractors hire suppliers to provide the necessary materials. Each rela-
tionship requires a contract, and of course each party wants to protect
its interests. The party with the greatest bargaining power and legal
resources, usually the owner, has the upper hand when it comes to
contract terms.4 The resulting imbalance of bargaining power and
tendency for risk-shifting leads not only to unfair contracts, but also
to poor working relationships between owners, contractors, subcon-
tractors, and suppliers, most of whom work with the same company
more than once.5
2 The definition of "construction" in this Note is a broad one. The word is used to refer
to both commercial and residential construction, including the entire spectrum of associated
work. See KEITH COLLIER, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 25 (1979) ("Construction work may be
described as the planned integration of materials and components on a permanent site by means
of skilled labor using tools and equipment to produce a permanent fixture to the land according
to a special design, including any fabrication which is done elsewhere according to the design of
the work prior to its integration into the work at the site.").
3 See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 474 ("[O]n a typical commercial construction project,
at least half of the work will be performed by subcontractors.").
' See JEREMIAH D. LAMBERT & LAWRENCE WHITE, HANDBOOK OF MODERN CON-
STRUCTION LAW 27-28 (1982) ("Like commercial contracts in other fields, construction con-
tracts are designed to achieve two goals: to define the practical and legal responsibilities of the
contracting parties (often in cumbersome technical language that itself reflects generations of
litigation and judicial precedent) and to shift common-law risks and liabilities in favor of the
party with the greater amount of negotiating leverage."). See also Mark L. MeAlpine & David
A. Breuch, A Uniform Construction Law Code: Is There a Foundation to Build On?, 74 MICH.
BJ. 554, 559 n.12 (1995) (pointing out that the excess of construction services in today's econ-
omy leads to an owner's market, allowing onerous contracts, and stating that these contracts,
coupled with low profit margins, lead contractors to seek additional compensation in the courts).
See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 478 (discussing a study by the Construction Industry
Institute that showed evidence of "antagonism and mistrust" between owners and contractors).
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Because the construction industry involves multiple parties and
complex problems, disputes are inevitable, 6 and litigation often re-
suits. Construction litigation is lengthy and expensive, with total liti-
gation costs sometimes exceeding the amount in controversy.
7
B. The Current State of Construction Contract Law
Construction contracts are typically governed by common law
contract principles. In addition to these common law rules, standard
contract forms prepared by industry groups-most notably the
American Institute of Architects ("AIA") and Associated General
Contractors of America ("AGC")--can influence the formation of
construction contracts. The industry-endorsed forms provide tem-
plates that can be used without changes as a project's contract or as a
sample for language to be integrated into an original contract. The
forms provide guidance on contract terms and conditions, making the
process of drafting contracts less time-consuming and less costly. By
creating standard forms, the construction industry has "demon-
strate[d] that it is possible to achieve certain basic industry agree-
ments on the standards for contractual risk allocations in various pro-
ject settings."8 However, there is no uniformity in the use of the
forms; they are not used on all projects.9 Nor do the forms provide
rules for contract interpretation, the area in which the industry needs
the most assistance. In addition, those implementing the standard con-
tract forms must keep in mind that each one is sponsored by a specific
industry group and may reflect the contracting preferences of that
group.
The UCC, first published in 1951 and most recently amended in
2001, added to the potential body of construction contracting law. Of
the ten articles dealing with specific subject matter,10 Article 2 (Sales)
is* most applicable to the construction industry. Article 2 "applies to
6 Some of the most commaon sources of construction disputes include mistakes in bids,
delays on the projects, and changes to the work. See H. MURRAY HOHNS, PREVENTING AND
SOLVING CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT DISPUrES 7, 25 (1979); LAMBERT & WHITE, supra note 4,
at 223-24. See also HORNS, supra, at 6 ("Nearly everyone in the construction industry is in-
volved in a dispute today.").
7 See BRIANM. SAMUELS, CONSTRUCTION LAW 1(1996).
s McAlpine & Breuch, supra note 4, at 556.
9 See id. at 559 n.6 (citing an AGC survey showing that the AIA general conditions form
was always modified in 30% to 40% of projects, sometimes or often modified in 35% to 55%,
and never modified in less than 20%).
10 There are thirteen articles in the UCC: (1) General Provisions, (2) Sales, (2A) Leases,
(3) Negotiable Instruments, (4) Bank Deposits and Collections, (4A) Funds Transfers, (5) Let-
ters of Credit, (6) Bulk Transfers, (7) Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading and Other Docu-
ments of Title, (8) Investment Securities, (9) Secured Transactions, (10) Effective Date and
Repealer, and (1I) Effective Date and Transition Provisions.
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transactions in goods,"" and defines goods as "all things (including
specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of iden-
tification to the contract for sale."'12 All construction contracts include
goods, but they also involve services. 13 Courts label such mixed
goods/services contracts as "hybrid" contracts. While the UCC does
not explicitly state that Article 2 is inapplicable to hybrid contracts,
courts have strictly adhered to the common law separation of goods
and services and have assumed that since hybrid contracts involve an
element of service, the UCC is not directly applicable.15
Since courts do not view hybrid contracts as UCC contracts per
se, they have struggled to interpret the contracts on a case-by-case
basis to determine whether the UCC should apply. As stated by Pro-
fessors White and Summers, "[jiudges and litigants frequently face
difficulty and uncertainty in determining whether the Code applies to
such hybrid transactions. Areas of continuous dispute include con-
struction contracts ....,,16 Courts have developed three different ap-
proaches in an effort to provide guidelines for the application of Arti-
cle 2 to hybrid contracts: the predominant factor test, contract bifurca-
tion, and comparison to th6 UCC by analogy. As detailed in the sec-
tions that follow, each approach has problems with predictability and
uniformity; however, the mere existence of the approaches demon-
strates that courts are quite willing to apply Article 2 to hybrid con-
tracts.
1. The Predominant Factor Test
The predominant factor test is the most frequently used approach
to hybrid contracts. 7 In applying the test, the court first determines
whether goods or services predominate in the transaction. Some fac-
" U.C.C. § 2-102(2001).
'2 Id. § 2-105(1).
13 The discussion in this Note excludes architectural, engineering, and design work done
on construction projects, because such work does not include goods.
14 See Diane J. Ault, Note, Contracts for Goods and Services and Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 9 RUTGERS-CAM. LJ. 303, 308 (1978) ('Nowhere is it stated in Article 2
that that article of the UCC is inapplicable to contracts involving goods and services.").
15 The distinction between sales and services developed in England, where the Statute of
Frauds required a contract for goods, but not for services, to be in writing. See William R. Rus-
sell, Note, Products and the Professional: Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transac-
tion, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 111, 113 (1972).
16 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 343 (5th ed.
2000). See also Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 512 (explaining that the interpretation of a hybrid
contract is "likely to lead to unpredictable or irrational results").
17 Legal scholars have defined other tests used by courts, such as the goods supplied test,
in which the UCC applies if goods are part of the contract, and the final product test, in which
the UCC applies if the final product is a good. These tests are similar to the predominant factor
test in that they involve a preliminary distinction between goods and services. See Ault, supra
note 14, at 303.
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tors taken into consideration include: the percentage of the contract
cost dedicated to goods compared with that dedicated to services,
whether the contract price was listed in one sum or whether costs for
services were separated, and contract language. If the court deter-
mines that services predominate, common law principles apply. If the
court determines that goods predominate, Article 2 of the UCC ap-
plies to the entire contract.
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital 18 is often cited as the source of
the predominant purpose test. This pre-UCC Sales Act case involved
a blood transfusion provided as part of the plaintiff's treatment in the
hospital. The blood was infected with hepatitis, and the plaintiff be-
came ill. The plaintiff sought warranty protection under the Sales Act,
arguing that the transaction between the hospital and patient was a
sale. The court disagreed, holding that the contract was "clearly one
for services."' 9 The court went on to say: "It has long been recognized
that, when service predominates, and transfer of personal property is
but an incidental feature of the transaction, the transaction is not
deemed a sale within the Sales Act."20 This statement by the court is
the one on which other courts have focused in applying the predomi-
nant factor test to other contracts under the UCC.
21
While grasping onto the sales-service distinction wholeheartedly,
courts have ignored the underlying rationale of the Perlmutter court,
which was unique to the medical setting and sought to protect hospi-
tals from strict liability for outcomes that cannot be predicted?2
Courts have applied the test to many contracts outside the medical
realm, without regard to policy. This approach results in an overem-
phasis on the sales-service distinction and not enough emphasis on
the facts of each individual case:
Subsequent courts, bound by their jurisdiction's version of
the Perlmutter sales-service distinction, may well be forced
to either mechanically follow that test or to conceal policy-
based decisions in their subjective factual analysis of the
's 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954).
'9 Id. at794.
20Id.
21 Construction contracts are often evaluated under the Perlmutter test. See A. Mark
Segreti, Jr., Note, The Application of Implied Warranties to Predominantly "Service" Transac-
tions, 31 OHIo ST. LJ. 580, 589 (1970) (stating that the sales-service distinction from Perlmut-
ter "has been followed in construction contract cases where the furnishing of materials is held to
be ony incidental to the work and labor performed").
Perlmutter, 123 N.E.2d at 795 ("If, however, the court were to stamp as a sale the sup-
plying of blood-or the furnishing of other medical aid-it would mean that the hospital, no
matter how careful, no matter that the disease-producing potential in the blood could not possi-
bly be discovered, would be held responsible, virtually as an insurer, if anything were to happen
to the patient as a result of 'bad' blood.").
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primary purpose of the contract in question. An approach that
forces a court to mask the real reason for its decision or re-
quires unnecessary manipulation of the facts cannot be
viewed as a particularly valid method of decisionmaking.23
The predominant factor test was applied to a construction contract
in Bonebrake v. Cox,24 in which Article 2 was found to be applicable
to a contract for the purchase and installation of used bowling alley
equipment. The court articulated the test for hybrid contracts: 'The
test for inclusion or exclusion is not whether [the contracts] are
mixed, but, granting that they are mixed, whether their predominant
factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of
service, with goods incidentally involved.., or is a transaction of a
sale, with labor incidentally involved. ''25 Because the purpose of the
contract was to replace equipment lost in a fire, the court determined
that goods predominated and applied Article 2 to the contract.26
The test provided by the Bonebrake court is still used in construc-
tion contract cases today. 27 The test is clear, but its application is not.
When a contract involves a combination of goods and services, there
is usually no precise boundary determining where goods end and ser-
vices begin; in such a conglomeration of activities, it is difficult to
point to the "predominant" factor. What one person may classify as a
predominant factor, another person may just as reasonably classify as
incidental to the transaction. Thus, there is little predictability in the
predominant factor test.2
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent in
McDowell v. Atco Rubber Products Inc.29 demonstrates how the test
can be applied to support either goods or services. The contract in
question was one in which the plaintiff purchased stainless steel ducts
from the defendant. The majority held that the transaction was for
goods. Even though the defendant had to perform services to manu-
facture the ducts, the court held that the contract was not "service ori-
23 Ault, supra note 14, at 307.
2 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974).
25 Id. at 960.
26 Id. In this case, the application of Article 2 meant that the buyer could pursue a remedy
for breach in accordance with § 2-607 since the buyer notified the seller of the breach within a
reasonable time.
27 As of March 1, 2002, there were 251 cases citing Bonebrake on www.westlaw.com.
28 The predominant factor test may also keep courts from addressing all of the issues in a
case. See Ault, supra note 14, at 305 ("After making the initial, and often dispositive,
determination as to whether the service element or the goods element predominates, the court
does not have to address any further issues or policy questions that may be present. Since the
initial factual determination forecloses further analysis, application of the predominantly service
test may result in the sacrificing of an equitable and well-reasoned decision for simplicity").
29 634 N.Y.S.2d 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
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ented. ''30 The dissenting judges reasoned that the entire contract was
for a service, because the plaintiff supplied the steel and the defen-
31dant's only job was to process the steel into ducts. Just as the judges
in this case could easily disagree about the application of the pre-
dominant factor test, so do judges in cases nationwide. 32
In McDowell, the UCC's warranty provisions protected the buyer.
Courts often seek to apply UCC warranties in cases where buyers
have no other remedy.3 3 So it seems courts using the predominant
factor test either follow Perlmutter and Bonebrake strictly, looking at
sales and service aspects without regard to policy, or they decide on a
policy-based outcome and manipulate the sales-service distinction to
achieve it. Whatever the reason, case law shows that where courts are
willing to consider a contract under the predominant factor test, the
likely result will be the application of Article 2 of the UCC.
30 Id at 556.
31 Id. at 557 (Mercure, J., dissenting).
32 Compare BMC Indus., Inc. v. Barth Indus. Inc., 160 F.3d 1322, 1329 (1lth Cir. 1998)
(holding a contract for the design, manufacture, and installation of eyeglass lens production
equipment was primarily for goods), with Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Sys., 455 N.E.2d 142,
150 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding a contract for the installation of a conveyer was primarily for
services). Compare Corsica Coop. Assoc. v. Behlen Mfg. Co., 967 F. Supp. 382, 384 (D.S.D.
1997) (holding a contract for the manufacture of building components at a grain storage facility
to be primarily for goods), and Gulf Coast Fabricators, Inc. v. G.M. Mosley, 439 So. 2d 36, 38
(Ala. 1983) (holding a contract for the construction of a prefabricated plant addition was primar-
ily for goods), with Al & Zack Brown, Inc. v. Bullock, 518 S.E.2d 458,462 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding a contract for the fabrication and erection of steel bins was primarily for services).
Compare S. Tank Equip. Co. v. Zartic, Inc., 471 S.E.2d 587, 589 (Ga. Ct.App. 1996) (holding a
contract for the supply and installation of a chemical mixing tank and other water treatment
equipment was primarily for goods), with Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Graver Tank &
Mfg., 470 F. Supp. 1308, 1324 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding a contract for the construction and
erection of a nuclear power plant liner was primarily for services). Compare Mennonite Dea-
coness Home & Hosp. Inc. v. Gates Eng'g Co., Inc., 363 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Neb. 1985) (holding
a contract for the manufacture of a roofimg system was primarily for goods), with Zielinski v.
Miller, 660 N.E.2d 1289, 1294 (fIl. App. Ct. 1995) (holding a contract for masonry work on a
home was primarily for services). Compare Standard Structural Steel Co. v. Debron Corp., 515
F. Supp. 803, 810 (D. Conn. 1980) (holding a contract for the erection of structural steel was
primarily for goods, afd, 657 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1981), and Belmont Indus., Inc. v. Bechtel
Corp., 425 F. Supp. 524, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding a contract for the design, fabrication, and
delivery of steel was primarily for goods), with Schenectady Steel Co., Inc. v. Bruno Trimpoli
Gen. Constr. Co., 350 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (App. Div. 1974) (holding a contract to furnish and
erect steel was primarily for services), aft'd, 34 N.Y.2d 939 (1974). Compare Port City Constr.
Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 266 So. 2d 896, 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 1972) (holding a contract to supply
and pour concrete was primarily for goods), with Freeman v. Shannon Constr., Inc., 560 S.W.2d
732, 734 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (holding a contract for pouring cement was primarily for ser-
vices).
33 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 344 ("Whether the court applies the Code
depends to some extent on the area of coverage at issue. Sympathetic plaintiffs often bring
breach of warranty suits, and these litigants may have greater success in invoking Code protec-
tion than parties to non-warranty suits.").
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2. Contract Bifurcation
Instead of trying to determine whether goods or services pre-
dominate in a contract, some courts bifurcate the contract and apply
Article 2 to only that portion involving goods?34 This was the ap-
proach taken in Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp.35 The court in that
case held that the UCC applied to the sale of office supplies and furni-
ture, but not to real estate, licenses, and good will in a contract for the
sale of a radio station. 36 Therefore, when the seller became aware of
the buyer's breach, it was obligated to notify the buyer that it would
resell the office supplies and furniture to a third party under section 2-
706 of the UCC.3 7 However, the seller was not similarly obligated
under the UCC as to the sale of the intangibles. The seller argued that
the goods were incidental to the purpose of the contract, and there-
fore, under the predominant factor test, the UCC was inapplicable.
The court did not follow the predominant factor test; instead it split
the contract, citing section 2-10238 as support that the UCC applies to
every sale involving goods.39
Another case in which the court relied on bifurcation, Stephenson
v. Frazier,4° involved the sale of a modular home, the construction of
a foundation, and the installation of a septic system. Since the home
itself was a good, Article 2 applied to that portion of the contract. The
UCC was not applicable to the foundation or septic system work,
however, because the court determined that portion of the contract to
be for services. 41 Section 2-508 of the UCC grants sellers the right to
cure as long as notice is given, and the seller in Stephenson wrote a
letter notifying the buyer of its intention to remedy the defects in the
home. The buyer refused to allow the seller cure the defects, so the
buyer could not rescind the contract for reasons related to the home.42
The services provided in laying the foundation were covered by
common law, but the result was the same as applying the UCC. Be-
cause the seller's letter did not indicate an intention to cure the de-
fects in the foundation, the buyer was entitled to rescind that portion
34 English courts adhere to the bifurcation approach when applying warranties to hybrid
contracts. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 653,664 (1957).
3- 381 F.2d222(10thCir. 1967).
36 Id. at 225.
37 Id. at 226.
38 "Unless the context otherwise requires, this article applies to transactions in goods...
U.C.C. § 2-102 (2001).
39 See Foster, 381 F.2d at 226 ("We see no reason not to view the Foster contract in two
parts as effecting the sale of goods and non-goods.").
40 399 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), transfer denied by 425 N.E.2d 73 (Ind. 1981).
41 Id. at 797.
42 Id.
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of the contract.4 3 The court then determined that the breach related to
the services was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of breach,
justifying rescission of the entire contract.44
The bifurcation approach is an attempt at strict adherence to the
UCC's definition of goods, but it is difficult to apply, especially in
construction contracts. When dealing with projects that involve an
endless number of goods and services, it is often impossible to sepa-
rate the goods from the services related to them. For example, in a
case such as Stephenson, foundation defects could just as likely be
due to problems with the concrete as to problems with the services
rendered. The more complex the project, the more difficulty there is
in separating the goods from the services that make the goods into a
finished product. Perhaps it is this difficulty in application that makes
the bifurcation approach much less popular with courts than the pre-
dominant factor test.'
3. Comparison to the UCC by Analogy
In some cases, courts reason by analogy that Article 2 should ap-
ply to a hybrid contract for the same reasons it would apply to a pure
transaction in goods. This approach is based on a comment to section
1-102 of the UCC, which recognizes that courts often make use of
analogies to apply useful laws to situations not expressly provided
for46 and encourages courts to continue that practice when construing
the UCC.47 English courts typically apply statutes by analogy, and
Dean Roscoe Pound thought American courts would eventually do
the same, viewing statutes "to be reasoned from by analogy the same
as any other rule of law."48 When dealing with hybrid contracts, many
courts have done exactly as Dean Pound predicted. The UCC is par-
ticularly well suited for analogy because it is "designed both to take
41 Id at 798.
Id. at 799.
45 Another approach similar to contract bifurcation is the use of the gravamen test, in
which the court determines whether the dispute is based on the goods or services. If based on
goods, Article 2 applies; if based on services, Article 2 does not apply. See HENRY D. GABRIEL
& LINDA J. RusCH, THE ABC's OF TIM UCC: ARTICLE 2: SALES 4 (1997) (comparing the con-
cepts for the sale of goods to transactions in goods); J.O. Hooker & Sons, Inc. v. Roberts Cabi-
net Co., 683 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1996) (holding that the common law parol evidence rule, not the
UCC version, applied to a contract for cabinet installation because the dispute involved the
parties' duties under the contract, not the goods).
46 See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (2001) ("Courts ... have recognized the policies embodied
in an act as applicable in reason to subject-matter which was not expressly included in the lan-
guage of the act .... They have done the same where reason and policy so required, even where
the subject-matter had been intentionally excluded from the act in general.") (citations omitted).
4 See id. ("This Act is drawn to provide flexibility .... Nothing in this Act stands in the
way of continuance of such action by the courts.").
48 Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383,385 (1908).
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account of rapidly changing customs and to achieve a satisfactory
accommodation between diverse competing interests." 49 The follow-
ing is the process courts use when applying the UCC by analogy:
The first step is to decide whether the goods involved fall
within the scope of the UCC definition of goods, that is,
whether Article 2 could be applied. [The court] then exam-
ines the interests present in the particular fact situation and
determines, on the basis of the equities involved, whether the
case should be governed by Article 2.50
Some cases from outside the construction realm indicate that the
service aspect of a transaction need not hinder the application of the
UCC. These cases provide the model for the analogy approach.
Beauty salon treatments have been analogized to sales of goods.
In Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc.,51 the New Jersey Supreme Court ap-
plied the UCC to a transaction involving the application of a perma-
nent wave solution at a beauty salon. The patron was injured by the
chemical solution and sought recovery under the warranty provisions
of the UCC. The court pointed out that the framers of the UCC in-
tended the code to be applied in analogous situations, unlimited by
technicalities and strict definitions.52 The court went on to say: "It
seems to us that the policy reasons for imposing warranty liability in
the case of ordinary sales are equally applicable to a commercial
transaction such as that existing in this case ... The decision to
apply the UCC warranty was based on a belief that the salon, as the
profit-maker, should bear the risks, especially given the patron's reli-
ance on the salon's skill. The court noted that the salon had a remedy
in bringing an action against the manufacturer of the permanent wave
solution.
The same concepts apply to construction contracts: the contractor
is the profit-maker and should therefore bear the risk, the owner relies
on the contractor's skill, and contractors have remedies against sup-
pliers and subcontractors for defective equipment and services. After
the Newmark decision, the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey decided to apply the UCC to hybrid contracts without going
49 Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 880,881 (1965) [hereinafter Premise for Judicial Reasoning].
50 Ault, supra note 14, at 314-15 (emphasis in original). See also WHrIE & SUMMERS,
supra note 16, at 27 (advocating a similar approach for non-sales contracts in which a court first
considers the policy behind the applicable UCC section and then decides whether the case lends
itself to the application of the UCC by analogy).
5I 258 A.2d 697 (NJ. 1969).
52 Id. at701.
51 Id. at 702.
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through any analysis: "Because of the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision, it is irrelevant whether the hybrid transaction at issue is pre-
dominantly one for goods or one for services. . . since either way,
New Jersey courts apply UCC warranty principles. ' M Thus, at least
one court is willing to apply the UCC to hybrid contracts without re-
gard to tests, bifurcation, or analogies. 55
After being analogized to a sale of goods, the selling of food is
now explicitly defined as a sale of goods under section 2-313. Before
the sale of food was added to the UCC, there was a circuit split, with
the majority adhering to the old rule that innkeepers did not sell food,
but instead provided a service and therefore were not covered by war-
ranties. 6 Now section 2-314 provides: "Under this section the serving
for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or
elsewhere is a sale.' 57 This movement from common law analogizing
to codification signals the path construction contracts could take. 8
Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co.59 is an example of the appli-
cation of the Sales Act (the UCC's precursor) by analogy to a con-
struction case. The Aced court held that the warranty of merchantabil-
ity was implied in a subcontract to install tubing for a heating system
on a home, despite the fact that the contract was service-oriented. The
court acknowledged that the contract was not a sales contract, but ex-
plained that "[t]here is no justification for refusing to imply a war-
ranty of suitability for ordinary uses merely because an article is fur-
nished in connection with a construction contract rather than one of
sale."9
60
Applying the UCC by analogy, unlike the other two tests, allows
a court to focus on the issues in a case, instead of on the factual de-
termination regarding goods and services. For this reason, application
of the UCC by analogy is probably the most rational and equitable of
the current approaches to hybrid contracts. 61 Unfortunately, like the
54 Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., Petrobras v. Nalco Chem. Co., 784 F. Supp. 160, 164 (D.NJ.
1992) (holding a contract to de-water fuel was governed by the UCC).
55 For a case involving the supply of electricity analogized to the sale of goods, see
Wivagg v. Duquesne Light Co., 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 694 (C.P. 1975).
56 See Segreti, supra note 21, at 582-83.
57 U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2001).
58 See Segreti, supra note 21, at 584 (discussing the addition of the sale of food to the
UCC and explaining that "it seems to be an a priori matter that the 'serving' aspect of the trans-
action does not keep it from being a sale covered by the law of implied warranty").
" 360 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1961), vacating Poole v. Functional Constr. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 391
(Cal. Ct. App. 1960).
60 d at 902.
61 See Ault, supra note 14, at 322 ("In light of the Code's mandate that its provision [sic]
be applied liberally in an attempt to modernize commercial law, the policy approach is clearly
the best method as it permits these concepts to be implemented in a thoughtful and well-
reasoned manner."); Comments and Casenotes, Dual Nature Contracts and the Uniform Corn-
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other approaches, analogizing has difficulties in application. Parties
cannot know if the court will be willing to analogize in their particu-
lar case. If a court does decide to analogize, that does not mean it will
necessarily find a reason to apply the UCC.
As agreed by commercial law and construction law scholars, no
matter what approach a court takes-and in part because courts have
so many approaches-there is no predictability in hybrid transaction
cases. 62 It is likely that many cases are brought to court just because
the parties are unsure whether common law or the UCC applies. If the
law were clearer, allowing parties to contract with the knowledge of
what law governed, there would be less uncertainty and less litigation.
II. THE PROPOSAL: APPLY THE UCC WITHOUT REGARD TO THE
SALES-SERVICE DISTINCTION
As suggested by courts applying the UCC by analogy, there may
no longer be a reason to distinguish between sales and services in a
hybrid contract because UCC principles apply to both. Due to the
prevalence of hybrid contracts and contracts for services, more con-
tracts are excluded from the UCC today than are directly covered by
it.63 Given the fact that the current economy is much more service-
oriented than the economy of the 1950s in which the UCC was
drafted, perhaps the sales-service distinction is no longer necessary:
When we discuss commercial law, many of us assume that
we are talking about transactions involving goods. Yet, in our
economy, the commercial services sector has already sur-
passed the goods sector in both the dollars involved and the
potential for future economic growth. The assumption that
mercial Code, 28 MD. L. REV. 136, 144 (1968) ("The use of the analogy doctrine would both
obviate the difficulty of severing the contract and extend the progressive Code formulations into
approgriate areas which otherwise would be beyond the scope of the Code.").
See SMITH, CURRIE & HANCOCK'S COMMON SENSE CONSTRUCTION LAW 50 (Neal J.
Sweeney et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter COMMON SENSE CONSTRUCTION LAW] ("There is no
hard and fast rule to determine whether the UCC applies to a hybrid construction contract ....
[G]eneral rules of thumb are subject to exceptions, however, and should not be relied upon to
predict with certainty whether the UCC will apply to any particular transaction."); WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 345 (apologizing for sorting hybrid cases by subject matter: "Of
course, our division of cases into subgroups of the kind described is confession of our igno-
rance. If we had a more pervasive and reliable principle to distinguish the cases where the Code
applies and those where it does not, we would state it and not feel the necessity of resorting to
cubby hole analysis."); Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 512 (explaining that tests like the pre-
dominant factor test show how treatment of hybrid contracts is "likely to lead to unpredictable.
.. results"); Note, Disengaging Sales Law from the Sale Construct: A Proposal to Extend the
Scope ofArticle 2 of the UCC, 96 HARV. L. REV. 470,471, 477 (1982) [hereinafter Disengaging
Sales Law] (describing courts' approaches to hybrid contracts as leading to inconsistent results
and "manipulating the facts of the case to characterize the transaction in question as a 'sale').
63 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Services Contracts: The Forgotten Sector of Commercial
Law, 26 LOY. L.A L. REV. 725, 727 (1993) [hereinafter Nimmer, Service Contracts].
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commercial practice emphasizes transactions in goods mis-
reads where we are and where we are heading as a society
and a legal system. 64
All of the approaches to hybrid contracts show a willingness by
the courts to consider the application of Article 2 to sales-service
transactions: Courts have also applied the UCC without predominance
tests, bifurcation, or analogy. The Article 2 definition of goods in-
cludes "specially manufactured goods," 65 and all hybrid construction
projects have as their goal a specially manufactured good-a finished
product that is "not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of
the seller's business." 66
Courts have applied the UCC to hybrid contracts through use of
the "specially manufactured" clause, based on the rationale that the
definition of goods should be broad so as to achieve greater uniform-
ity in transactions. This approach has a limitation, though, because the
UCC also defines goods as "movable at the time of identification to
the contract for sale."67 Therefore, courts have not often relied on the
section 2-105 definition for the construction of permanent structures,
although courts have found galvanized steel buildings on concrete
foundations 68 and a one million gallon water tank69 to be "movable."
These cases illustrate that the explicit language of Article 2 can
be applied to construction contracts without regard to the sales-
services distinction. The section 2-105 definition of goods allows the
UCC to be applied to many hybrid construction contracts, but ex-
cludes those contracts that result in what the court considers an im-
movable good. The same types of goods and services, and the same
contracting concerns, are involved in building structures considered
movable as in building those considered immovable. If the UCC ap-
plies to one type of contract, it should apply to the other.
The principles underlying the UCC are just as applicable to con-
struction law as they are to sales: "(a) to simplify, clarify and modern-
ize the law governing commercial transactions; (b) to permit the con-
tinued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and
64 Raymond T. Nimmer, Uniform Codification of Commercial Contract Law, 18 RUT-
GERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 465,491 (1992) [hereinafter Nimmer, Uniform Codification].
65 U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2001).
66 Id. § 2-201(3)(a).
67 Id. § 2-105(1).
68 Robertson Cos. v. Kenner, 311 N.W.2d 194, 200 (N.D. 1981) ("Although the storage
facilities are not 'goods' to be taken from the shelf, they are, in the words of the UCC, a mov-
able thing specially manufactured .... These buildings... are capable of being detached from
their foundations and are thus 'movable."').
69 Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 580
(7th Cir. 1976) (stating that the court is "unaware of any authority that specially manufactured
small dies should be goods and a very large tank not so classified").
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agreement of the parties; (c) to make uniform the law among the vari-
ous jurisdictions. ' 7°
The law would be clarified and uniform if Article 2 were applied
to all construction contracts. Some courts are already moving towards
straight application of the UCC to hybrid construction contracts,
without regard to sales and services.71 Application of Article 2 also
solves the problems of balance of power and excessive litigation.72
This could be accomplished by court action using the language of
section 2-105, with a revision to the definition of "goods, 73 or court
action holding that Article 2 applies by analogy to all construction
contracts, without need for analysis on a case-by-case basis.
Application of Article 2 could also be accomplished by adding a
new section to the UCC,74 similar to Article 2A for leases. The pro-
gression of leases from uncodified transactions into Article 2A trans-
actions mirrors developments in the construction industry. Before
Article 2A, some courts applied Article 2 to leases by analogy, some
held that Article 2 applied directly because leases are transactions in
goods, and other courts refused to apply Article 2 because leases are
not sales. Now leases are governed by a uniform set of principles
within the UCC. 75 The UCC could also be applied to construction
contracts by the hub and spoke approach, in which the "hub" sets
forth general contract formation and interpretation rules, and the
70 U.C.C. § 1-102 (2001).
71 See Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., Petrobras v. Nalco Chem. Co., 784 F. Supp. 160 (D.N.J.
1992).
72 See Justin Sweet, The American Institute of Architects: Dominant Actor in the Con-
struction Documents Market, 1991 Wis. L. Rnv. 317, 318 ("Construction, a complex process
that can.span a lengthy period of time and encounter many disruptions and unexpected condi-
tions, needs extensive rules.").
73 The term "movable" would need to be redefined or eliminated. For a proposed amend-
ment to section 2-105, see Disengaging Sales Law, supra note 62, at 488 ("'Goods' should be
defined to include any property interest (other than a security interest) in goods.").
74 The criteria for adding a new section to the UCC are applicable to construction con-
tracts: the construction industry has economic significance, codification would benefit the
industry, the industry is national, it is unique from areas already codified, and codification is
reasonably achievable. See Nimmer, Service Contracts, supra note 63, at 729; Nimmer, Uniform
Codification, supra note 64, at 480-81 ("Codification projects in commercial law are reserved
for areas of commercial practice regarded as important economically or legally .... Volume,
importance and uniqueness are reasonably considered potential elements that support a decision
to codify an area of contract law."). See also Sweet, supra note 72, at 340 (describing a 1982
report from an ABA task force, which suggested that the definitions in the UCC be modified so
as to broaden the coverage of hybrid transactions).
15 See U.C.C. art. 2A (2001). See also U.C.C. Foreword to 2000 Official Text and Com-
ments at xiii (explaining that lease law prior to inclusion in the UCC was "uncertain in conse-
quence"); GABRIEL & RUSCH, supra note 45, at 4-5 (discussing the non-uniform approach of
courts applying Article 2 to leases prior to the enactment of Article 2A); Nimmer, Service Con-
tracts, supra note 63, at 726 (stating that Article 2A is an exception to the stringent application
of the UCC and courts' unwillingness to revisit previous UCC decisions).
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"spokes" provide rules for specific types of transactions.76 Alterna-
tively, the construction industry could draft its own code, separate
from the UCC, but including basic UCC principles.77
Im[. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSAL
A. Article 2 Addresses Industry Concerns
The UCC balances power among the parties to a contract, provid-
ing an equal playing field between "merchants" who know the busi-
ness. 78 Comment 1 to section 2-104 states the purpose of the merchant
concept: "This Article assumes that transactions between profession-
als in a given field require special and clear rules which may not ap-
ply to a casual or inexperienced seller or buyer., 79 In addition, be-
cause of its focus on fairness and industry standards, the UCC places
the process of construction contracting in the setting of general busi-
ness principles'.8 0 All contracts under the UCC impose an obligation
of good faith.81 There is also a common law duty of good faith; how-
ever, the UCC focuses on interpretation of good faith within the con-
76 The hub and spoke concept was proposed by the drafting committee of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in March 1995 for application to the
software industry. However the executive committee rejected the concept out of concern that,
because one of the "spokes" would be for leases, and Article 2A already exists for leases, state
uniformity would be difficult to maintain. The current thinking by the drafting committee is that
there will likely be a new Article 2C for software licensing. See Henry J. Reske, UCC Rewrite is
Shot Down, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 50 (explaining the rejection of the hub and spoke concept
by the executive committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws). For an argument in support of the hub and spoke approach, see Henry J. Reske, Software
Publishers Take Interest in UCC, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 22 (quoting Professor Nimmer:
"While sales of goods are a major facet of modem commercial practice, intangibles, informa-
tion, and services contracting are more and more important. In this respect, a hub-and-spoke
approach can be contrasted to the Balkanization that may follow in an effort to adopt separate
articles for each major field.").
77 See McAlpine & Breuch, supra note 4, at 554 (reporting that the ABA forum commit-
tee on the construction industry is considering creating a uniform code for construction, and the
AGC has shown an interest in assisting in the drafting); Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 540-41
("What is needed is a systematic and polycentric approach, informed by the latest empirical
information, aimed at development of a cohesive matrix of legal principles .... The establish-
ment of a single, straightforward set of legal rules governing construction contracts should make
the law more accessible and reduce transaction costs associated with contract formation and
dispute resolution, as well as help identify and sharpen risks....").
78 U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2001). See Hiram Thomas, The Proposed Uniform Revised Sales
Act, Bus. LAW., July 1947, at 18 ("The Act recognizes ... that contracts between merchants
should be construed in the light of the skill and knowledge which they presumably possess and
that for like reason merchants should be held to rather stricter standards than other people.").
79 U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 1 (2001).
so See William L. Beers, The New Commercial Code, Bus. LAW., July 1947, at 17 ("In
trying to get beyond some of the antiquated rules of the common law, contracts running into
pages of fine print have been devised, nearly all of which go too far in favor of one side or the
other .... The Code will take account of actual, real life customs and needs.").
8K U.C.C. § 1-203 (2001).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
text of the particular industry.82 Additionally, an exact codification of
good faith can have greater influence on parties than a generally un-
derstood, uncodified principle.
Also in accordance with common law, the UCC provides reme-
dies for unconscionable contracts.83 But just as with the obligation of
good faith, the UCC relates unconscionability directly to the industry.
The drafters provide the following test for unconscionability:
"[W]hether, in the light of the general commercial background and
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses in-
volved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable.., at the time of the
making of the contract."84 This codification of common law through a
precise definition, tailored to objective industry standards, will be
beneficial to those working in the construction industry.
Under the UCC, the parties' course of dealing with each other and
the usage of the trade both supplement agreements.85 These supple-
mentary concepts can benefit the interpretation of contracts in an in-
dustry like construction, where companies work with each other often
and where there are numerous well-established ways of conducting
business. Under the UCC, "the meaning of the agreement of the par-
ties is to be determined by the language used by them and by their
action, read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and
other surrounding circumstances. 86 The UCC allows for new indus-
try standards, doing away with the strict common law requirements of
custom. The UCC would therefore recognize current advances in the
industry,87 as well as the standards set forth in standard contract forms
like those promulgated by the AIA and AGC.88
Of course parties can contract around the UCC provisions and
continue to draft contracts that are weighted in their favor. But the
UCC will still provide a model of a professional, evenhanded contract
relationship. At the very least, applying the UCC to all construction
contracts can make parties aware that the one-sided contracts now
common in the industry are not the default. Contractors, subcontrac-
tors, and suppliers may use the UCC concepts of merchants, good
faith, unconscionability, course of dealing, and usage of trade in ne-
gotiating contract terms.
Applying the UCC allows for fair, understandable, uniform deci-
sions. However, these benefits are weakened by the current case-by-
82 Id. Cmt.
8' Id. § 2-302.
84 Id. cmt. 1.
8' M §1-205.
86 Id. cmt. 1.
87 Id. cmt. 5.
88 Id.
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case court determinations; there is no way for a party to predict if the
UCC will apply to its particular dispute.89 With the varied approaches
to hybrid contracts and court decisions that can be used to justify ap-
plication, as well as non-application, of the UCC, both parties can
find support for their positions and are less likely to settle disputes
before resorting to litigation. Even in cases that go to trial, litigation
will be more straightforward, and perhaps less time- and cost-
prohibitive, with the application of clear contracting rules.
Related to balancing power and reducing the need for litigation,
application of the UCC would make project planning less uncertain
and risky. Parties will be aware of the contract interpretation rules
applicable to the project before the project gets underway. Uncer-
tainty and risk is inherently prevalent in the industry; there is no need
to add more through the law. Since courts across jurisdictions are al-
ready applying Article 2 to construction contract disputes, the indus-
try°° and the law91 would be better served if the standard were to ap-
ply Article 2 in all hybrid construction contract cases.
The words of William L. Beers writing about the "new" UCC in
1947 summarize why it makes sense for use by the construction in-
dustry today: "It is in the commercial field that the uncertainties of
the common law may do the most harm and a statutory codification
the most good." g The construction industry could benefit from the
balance of power provided by the UCC. In addition, if Article 2 were
the standard, parties could better settle disputes on their own without
resorting to litigation.93 Moreover, the clarity and predictability of the
UCC would make project planning and risk assessment more certain.
89 See Nimmer, Uniform Codification, supra note 64, at 465 ('The advantages need to be
seen in contrast to codification's primary alternative - deriving commercial contract law through
scattered court decisions or unlitigated traditions.").
90 Application of the UCC will assist construction industry professionals in doing busi-
ness. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, I0 U. FLA. L. REV.
367, 378-79 (1957) ('The rules between seller and buyer are stated in terms of the issues and of
the facts which sellers and buyers do think about; technical traps are eliminated; good faith
interpretation and action are protected so far as circumstances will permit; and if it does come to
litigation the remedies are made flexible and are freed from delay, trickery, and technicality.").
, Lawyers and judges will also benefit from application of the UCC. See Daniel E.
Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 447 (1971). "Busy lawyers... are in desperate need of a relatively simple, quickly
available source of law for the majority of cases where the amount in controversy cannot justify
countless hours of research and analysis of conflicting case law. The UCC fills this need, and if
the problem does not deal with sale of goods contract, then the Code has to be stretched a bit in
order to fill this need .... The use of particular sections of the Code lends an aura of authority
and may justify a judge in doing forthrightly something that he has had to do in the past by
twisting the law, or doing something that he has been afraid to do in the past because of a lack
of enough clear authority to support his position." Id. at 480.
92 Beers, supra note 80, at 14.
13 See Nimmer, Uniform Codification, supra note 64, at 475.
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B. UCC Provisions Are a Good Fit for Construction Contracts
As explained in reference to the concepts of good faith and un-
conscionability in the previous section, many UCC provisions are
codifications of existing common law principles. 94 Part of the advan-
tage in applying the UCC to hybrid construction contracts is not re-
lated to differences between the UCC and common law, but to the
fact that the UCC sets forth general contracting principles in a clear,
organized way with a body of law that is recognized across jurisdic-
tions. 95 It makes no difference that some of these principles are iden-
tical to common law; construction industry professionals, their law-
yers, and judges all can refer to the UCC with greater ease than to the
current amalgamation of common law principles.
In addition to codification of common law principles, the UCC
includes some provisions that depart from common law in a way that
benefits parties to a hybrid construction contract. Although these pro-
visions can be avoided, they nonetheless set a good framework for
contract interpretation.
1. The UCC Focuses on Intentions Rather Than Formalities
When dealing with the creation and modification of contracts,
the UCC departs from formal, stilted common law rules and instead
approaches contracts with practical, often timesaving methods. The
UCC approach to contract formation and modification fits today's
construction industry practices.
Instead of requiring communications of formal offer and accep-
tance, the UCC allows contract formation "in any manner sufficient to
show agreement. 96 As long as there is evidence that the parties in-
tend to contract, terms can be left open without the contract failing for
indefiniteness. 97 Signed firm offers do not require consideration to be
held open.98 In addition, the UCC does away with the common law
94 For a discussion of other UCC provisions that are the same as common law rules, in-
cluding the parol evidence rule, see Premise for Judicial Reasoning, supra note 49, at 886, 890-
91.
95 See Disengaging Sales Law, supra note 62, at 484 ("This style of drafting enhances
article 2's adaptability to transactions embodying the same basic structure as that of the sale
paradigm.").
9 U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2001). See J. Lee Gregory, Inc. v. Scandinavian House, 433 S.E.2d
687, 690 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the UCC applied to the supply and installation of
windows in an apartment complex, so a letter by the owner stating its intent to hire the contrac-
tor, coupled with the conduct of the contractor in taking measurements for the windows, was
"sufficient to show an agreement" under § 2-204). See also WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 16,
at 28 (explaining the ways in which the UCC has made contract formation simpler than under
the common law).
97 See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2001).
98 Id. § 2-205.
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mirror-image rule, allowing acceptance "in any manner and by any
medium reasonable in the circumstances." 99 These formation princi-
ples make it easier for parties to create contracts through the exchange
of bids, purchase orders, firm offers,1°° and confirmatory documents.
A contract exists where there is an intent to be bound, regardless of
whether the bid/purchase order and confirmation letter contain differ-
ent terms. The formation provisions of the UCC also allow parties
who intend to contract to continue with a transaction despite the fact
that the terms of a complex project might not all be specified.01
The UCC also departs from strict common law concepts when
addressing contract modifications. Section 2-209(1) provides that
modifications to a contract do not require consideration to'be binding.
This is a departure from the common law pre-existing duty rule,
which requires new consideration for each contract modification.
While the absence of consideration could be a problem if one party
decided to make a false claim based on a non-existent, modification,
section 2-209(2) allows the parties to stipulate that all modifications
be made by signed agreement. Modifications without consideration
can be particularly useful in the construction setting, where changes
are inevitable and frequent.'10
2. The UCC Provides Implied Warranties
Under the common law, if a product does not conform to the
representations of the seller and there is no express warranty, the
buyer can pursue an action for negligence. The UCC provides two
types of implied warranties that attach to a sale. A plaintiff can
recover under these warranties instead of resorting to a negligence
claim. The first implied warranty is the warranty of merchantability.
It states that merchants who deal in goods of a certain kind warrant
the goods as "merchantable." 10 3 The second type of implied warranty
99 Id. § 2-206.
10o But see Premise for Judicial Reasoning, supra note 49, at 889 (explaining that § 2-205
could be problematic in construction contracts when a contractor supplies a firm bid and cannot
revoke it). It can be argued that the UCC reliance on industry standards and good faith would
prevent bids from being kept open where mistake or other inequities were involved, so the con-
tractor's bargaining position would be protected. In addition, under § 2-205 such a bid would
remain open only for a reasonable time, not to exceed three months.
101 When terms are left open, UCC gap-filling provisions apply, as does reliance on course
of dealing and usage of trade. The gap-fillers relate to price, delivery, time, termination, pay-
ment, and performance terms. See U.C.C. §§ 2-305, 2-306, 2-307, 2-308, 2-309, 2-310, 2-311.
See also Nimmer, Uniform Codification, supra note 64, at 477 ("Codification enacts principles
grounded in commercial understanding that supply parts of an agreement if the contract is silent.
This is important in the setting where the parties cannot devote huge resources to making a deal.
It also levels out disparities caused by diversity of expertise and resources in negotiation.").
102 See J & R Elec. Div. of J.O. Mory Stores, Inc. v. Skoog Constr. Co., 348 N.E.2d 474
(ill. App. Ct. 1976) (holding that a contract for electrical work was not governed by the UCC;
the subcontractor could not recover money due on modified work because there was no
consideration).
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"merchantable. ' 1°3 The second type of implied warranty is the war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose. It states that when a seller
"has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are
required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment
... there is... an implied warranty."
10'
Both of the warranties are applicable to the construction setting,
and both have been applied to construction contracts by courts. War-
ranties have been implied in contracts for the manufacture of a roof-
ing system,105 the installation of a water heater,1 6 the manufacture of
ducts, 1°7 the construction of an amusement park ride component,"'
the construction of a cable television system,1°9 the manufacture and
installation of an energy system," 0 and the manufacture of building
components."'
While the contract forms drafted by industry groups such as the
AIA and AGC contain express warranties, 112 the UCC provides war-
ranty remedies where there is no express language. The implied war-
ranty of merchantability attaches when the party providing the goods
deals in goods of that kind, which will typically be the case in a con-
struction contract. The implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose will also be in effect in most construction contracts, because
the owner or contractor relies on the skill of the contractor, subcon-
tractor, or supplier, and the party doing the work has reason to know
the purpose for which it is required. Therefore, if all hybrid construc-
tion contracts were covered by the UCC, all would likely be covered
by implied warranties. Just as with other UCC provisions, implied
'03 U.C.C. § 2-314(l) (2001). See id. §2-314(2) for the elements involved in merchantabil-
ity: "Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as (a) pass without objection in the trade.
. (b)... are of fair average quality... (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes... (d) run.., of
even kind, quality and quantity ... (e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled... (f)
conform to the promise... on the container ..
'04 Id. § 2-315.
10s See Mennonite Deaconess Home & Hosp., Inc. v. Gates Eng'g Co., 363 N.W.2d 155
(Neb. 1985).
106 See Worrell v. Barnes, 484 P.2d 573 (Nev. 1971), overruled on other grounds by
Calloway v. City of Reno, 993 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 2000).
107 See McDowell v. Atco Rubber Prods. Inc., 634 N.Y.S.2d 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
08 See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1971).
109 See Entron, Inc. v. Gen. Cablevision of Palatka, 435 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1970).1o See Besicorp Group, Inc. v. Thermo Electron Corp., 981 F. Supp. 86 (N.D.N.Y. 1997),
amended by No. 90-CV-434, 1998 WL 37599 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1998).
11 See Corsica Coop. Ass'n. v. Behlen Mfg. Co., 967 F. Supp. 382 (D.S.D. 1997).
112 See CHARLES M. SINK & MARK D. PETERSEN, THE A201 DESKBOOK: UNDERSTAND-
ING THE REVISED GENERAL CONDITIONS 13 (1998) (providing the text of the AIA form: "The
Contractor warrants... that materials and equipment.., will be of good quality and new...
that the Work will be free from defects ... and that the Work will conform to the requirements
of the Contract .... ").
1086 [Vol. 52:1067
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING
warranties can be disclaimed;" 3 however, just like those other provi-
sions, the warranties at least provide a clear default rule.
3. The UCC Excuses Performance Based on Impracticability
It is common for a construction contract to contain a force ma-
jeure clause, excusing the contractor from liability for delay caused
by events out of its control, such as acts of God. Section 2-615 of the
UCC provides a similar allowance for cases in which the contract
does not contain a force majeure clause. While common law and
many construction contracts require the strict standard of impossibil-
ity, the UCC excuses performance for impracticability." 4 Given the
expenses involved in construction projects, the most logical approach
is to excuse impracticability. Though more realistic, the standard is
not lax. Under the UCC, a seller still has to prove impracticability,
and increased cost alone is insufficient." 5
Suppliers are usually covered by section 2-615 because they deal
in goods. However, contractors working with the suppliers are likely
to be held to more restrictive standards. Two parties working in the
same industry on the same project should not be held to two different
performance standards. Application of the UCC would yield a ra-
tional standard for excused performance and would hold all parties in
the industry to an identical standard.
4. Problematic UCC Provisions
Not all of the UCC provisions are beneficial to the construction
industry. While section 2-725 provides a uniform statute of limita-
tions of four years, the statute starts running when the breach occurs,
regardless of the buyer's knowledge.1 6 Most state rules and the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure start the statute running at the time the
plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the breach. Especially
"' U.C.C. § 2-316 (2001).
"'4 Id. § 2-615(a) (stating that delayed delivery or non-delivery is excused if "made
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made"). See COMMON SENSE CONSTRUCTION LAW,
supra note 62, at 61 (stating that the UCC provides a "broader ground for excusing performance
than is available under the common law").
115 U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (2001). See Sachs v. Precision Prods. Co., 476 P.2d 199 (Or.
1970) (holding that the UCC applied to the manufacture of a hoist, but since the impracticability
definition was not met, the manufacturer was liable for damages).
116 See Belmont Indus., Inc. v. Bechtel Corp., 425 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (barring a
subcontractor's action for breach of contract for work on a petrochemical complex); S. Tank
Equip. Co. v. Zartic, Inc., 471 S.E.2d 587 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (barring a seller's claim for dam-
ages when the buyer refused to pay under a contract for the sale and installation of water treat-
ment equipment); Meyers v. Henderson Constr. Co., 370 A.2d 547 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1977) (barring a seller's action for breach under a contract for the supply and installation of
overhead doors).
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in complex construction projects, it may take more than four years to
discover a breach. As such, parties could be unreasonably foreclosed
from pursuing claims. In order to apply the UCC to all construction
contracts, the statute of limitations could be amended to require a
"knowledge" standard for hybrid construction contracts, while keep-
ing the "occurrence" standard for goods.
Section 2-601 gives buyers the remedy of rejecting the goods if
they "fail in any respect to conform to the contract."' 17 This "perfect
tender" rule is impractical in the construction setting. Just because a
structure fails to meet every contract specification, the owner should
not be able to reject the entire structure. The perfect tender rule has
been limited by the seller's right to cure defective goods and by the
UCC's adherence to good faith, industry standards, and course of
dealing between parties. Because of these restrictions and the courts'
reluctance to apply the perfect tender rule, Professors White and
Summers state "the law would be little changed if 2-601 gave the
right to reject only upon 'substantial' non-conformity.""' 8 So, while
daunting on its face, the perfect tender rule might not be a tremendous
obstacle to application of the UCC to hybrid construction contracts.
Not every provision of the UCC is a perfect fit with the construc-
tion industry, but the benefits in applying the UCC outweigh the
problems. One of the greatest advantages in applying the UCC is not
the innovation the UCC brings to common law concepts, but instead
the way the UCC records common law concepts in their original state.
Many of the industry's contracting concerns could be addressed by
giving the industry some well-defined rules to follow. Where the
UCC does alter the common law, the effects are for the most part
beneficial. And where there is a detriment to the industry, problems
can be solved in whatever approach is taken to apply the UCC-by
courts, by a new section, in the "spokes" of the hub and spoke ap-
proach, or in a construction code.
CONCLUSION
The construction industry has the economic significance, the
volume of work, and the complexity of projects deserving of a dis-
tinct body of governing law. Moreover, a clearer statement of the law
would accomplish needed improvements in the industry, such as
equalizing bargaining power among parties and reducing litigation.
Courts have recognized the applicability of the UCC to construction
contracts by utilizing predominance tests, bifurcating contracts, and
U.C.C. § 2-601 (2001).
118 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 314.
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comparing the UCC to the contract in question. These approaches
demonstrate that the UCC can be a useful approach, yielding rational
decisions; yet the way in which the UCC is applied lacks the predict-
ability necessary to properly benefit the industry. By applying the
UCC to all hybrid construction contracts without resorting to the dis-
tinction between sales and services, the clarity, uniformity, and pre-
dictability necessary in the industry can be achieved.
EMMIE WESTt
t Thanks to Professor Morris Shanker, whose sales class provided the inspiration for the
topic of this Note. Thanks also to Professor Jonathan Entin for his assistance throughout the
writing process.
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